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CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SISTER MARIE CAROLYN KLINKHAMER, OYP.t

EVALUATION of the contributions of a jurist to constitutional law,
or to some other widely known legal field, has become a rather
common method of measuring the legal stature of such a person. Notably
small has been the number of such studies within the realm of administrative law, undoubtedly because this phase of jurisdiction has been
the most recent to appear, and is as yet the most amorphous. Its characteristfcs lend themselves to, and indeed render imperative, some preliminary consideration of the history of this branch of the law, for only
then can the activities of Edward Douglas White, in relation to administrative law, be seen in their proper perspective.
A combination of circumstances, added to his own natural aptitudes
and skills, allowed White to assume the position of director of the new
legal growth of the late '90's and early 1900's. One of these was the
passage of three acts: the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These laws,
"owing to the Court's interpretation in general ?nd White's in many pirticular
"instances, were the subject of subsequent perfection by the Congress. Especially is the large body of administrative law associated with the enforcement
of the Act to Regulate Commerce the result of White's direct pronouncements
upon judicial questions. His inclination to leave to administrative determination questions of fact rather than have the Courts pass upon them, resulted
in the formation of a code of administrative law which today is invaluable
in the enforcement of congressional statutes."'
The other circumstances ,responsible for White's position in this
field were: the rapidly changing social and economic conditions of the
country, together with the national faith in the ability of government
to solve -their attendant problems; the presence of sympathetic executive and legislative officials; the appearance on the bench of a gradually
increasing number of like-minded justices; and his own background of
training and practice in both the civil and common law. Impelled by
t Sisters of Saint Dominic, Congregation of the Most Holy Rosary. Adrian Dominican
House of Studies, Washington, ,D. C.
Revised from part of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Catholic University of America. The dissertation
was published in 1943 by the Catholic University of America Press.
1. Hartman, Constitutional Doctrines of Edward Douglass White (Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Cornell University, 1936) 352.
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these circumstances and abilities, he made for himself a secure place
in a field of law whose importance and ramifications were increasing
at an unprecedentedly rapid pace.
Historically, administrative law has occupied a strongly analogous
position in the common-law world to that which equity once occupied in
relation to its older brother, chancery. The famed constitutional historian, A. V. Dicey, indeed, refused even to admit the existence of such
an apparently exotic growth. Others followed his example, or shared
his views, and for this reason alone, writings on the subject have been
conspicuous, by their absence until very recently. American administrative law has likewise been adversely affected by the confusion seemingly inevitable in consideration of the departments of government.
Students of political science have been bewildered when they have tried
to find the lines of demarcation between one department and another.
The problem here is no new one, for James Madison remarked, with
feeling, in The Federalist:
"Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the science of government has
yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces, the legislative, executive and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur
in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these
subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science." 2 _
As though these two factors were not enough, recent legal 'research
has been complicated by yet another, and more potent because hidden,
one. Legal writers finally began to recognize the existence of administrative law and to fill legal periodicals with articles concerning the
subject about twenty years ago; this period coincided with the date of
White's death, and may partially account for the comparatively infrequent mention of White's name in the studies of administrative lawyers. At about the same time, however, there was arising a popular
feeling against bureaucracy which impelled Felix Frankfurter to declare:
"Perhaps the dominant feeling about government today is mistrust. The
tone of most comment, whether casual or deliberate, implies that in' 3
eptitude and inadequacy are the chief characteristics of government.
For most of the period intervening between White's death and the
present, therefore, such material as has appeared in American writings
2. 37 MAiIsox, FEDERALIST (1831) 152, quoted by McGuire, The Need for a Federal
Administrative Court (1936) 5 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 47.
3. FRANxvuRTER, THE PUBIC AND ITS GOVERHENT (1930) 3.
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has been characterized by a tone of extreme caution, not to say suspicion. Only very recently has this attitude begun to disappear, and only
very recently has it become possible for an jurist to be proclaimed a
leading figure in the field of administrative law without having attached
to him, at the same time, the label of bureaucrat.
Meaning of Administrative Law
The precise meaning of administrative law has been difficult to determine, and much of the cloudiness which has surrounded the discussion
of it has undoubtedly arisen from a lack of nicety in its definition. One
of the reasons for the nebulous character of the term has been the timelag between its first use-in 1869 by Austin-and its present status.
If a writer on common law wete to return from a time prior to Austin's
to our own day, he would, in the language of the present Chief Justice
of the United States,
"encounter strange intruders within the sacred precincts of the law, beyond
the ken of Blackstone and Kent and Story, and only-vaguely hinted at now
and then in the judicial opinions of a generation ago. He would find new
types of procedure, and an administrative system, growing by leaps and bounds,
in which non-judicial officers determine rights by methods, quasi-judicial and
enforce, them often without resort to the courts. He would observe a vast
system of statutory rights and liabilities in large measure founded upon the
idea, new to English law, that the basis of liability is not the fault of a wrongdoer, but such method of distributing the burden of loss as accepted social
policy dictates." 5
Parenthetically, it may be observed that White's first law case, Police
Jury v. Tardos,6 is an exact illustration of so distributing the burden
of loss.
The formidable and mushrQom-like growth of administrative law
which confronts the American lawyer today has been variously defined
at diverse stages of its existence. To a pioneer in its American phase,
Frank Goodnow, it appeared that "administrative law and administration
have to do with the functions, the physiology of government, so to
speak." 7 This was an oversimplification of the problem according to a
later writer, who stated:
"Broadly conceived, administrative law includes the law that is made by, as
Max Radin, The Courts and Administrative Agencies (1935) 23 CALW. L. Rv.469.
5. Stone, The Common Law in the United States (1936) 50 HARv. L. REV. 4.
4.
6.
7.

22 La. Ann. 58 (1870).
GOODNOW, ADSiNwISTRATIVE LAW (1905) 3.
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-well as the law that controls, the administrative authorities of a government.
By the term law is here meant all those regulations, orders, and decisions,
whether of general or particular applicability, that have consequences in terms
of a postulated legal order. By the term administrative authorities is here
meant all those public officers and organs that are charged with the amplification, application, and execution of statutory law and the exercise of commonlaw and constitutional executive powers. . . .The administrative law that
controls administrative- authorities is made by constituent or constitutionmaking authorities, by legislatures, by the courts, and by administrative su8
periors in giving, directions to their administrative subordinates."
This is perhaps the most comprehensive of definitions, aithough there
are certainly large numbers of others to be found
There are, furthermore, shades of meaning and niceties of thought
which must be added to the definition before it will be sufficiently
comprehensive for the purposes of most writers. This necessity arises
out of the peculiar and contingent character of this type of law.1 0 Probably for this reason, Dean Roscoe Pound maintains that the definition
should be still further expanded.
"'In its widest sense it includes the entire system of laws under which the
machinery of the state works and by which the state performs all governmental acts .... In a narrower sense, and as commonly used today, administrative law Implies that branch of modem law under which the executive department of government, acting.in a quasi legislative or quasi judicial capacity,
interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the
well-being of the community .... 21
2
Such a definition is far removed from the early one of Ernst Freund,1
and accounts amply for the explanatory comment of John Dickinson,
that "the provenience of the term is far from reassuring."'" The definitions given by earlier writers are definitely anachronisms now. Thus,
for example, Nathan Isaacs was perhaps correct in his' explanation of
the precarious position of administrative law in our system twenty years
ago, the time when White had just concluded his writing and when, his
8. HART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940) 3.
9. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. REv. 619.
10. Ibid, and FRANKFuRTER, THE PuBLIc AND ITs GOVERNMNT'(1930).

11.

Pound, Constitutional Aspects of Administrative Law (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 411.

12.

SEARs, CASES oN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1938), vii, citing FREuND, THE GROWTH or

AisrmicAN ADMInISTRATiVE LAW (1923).

13.
513.

Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Fear of Bureaucracy (1928) 14 A. B. A. J.
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contributions could not be evaluated because few writers were sure of
the proper sphere of 'administrative law', but today who could argue
that "the concept of administrative law in our system is really an aggregate of negative rather than positive propositions?"' 4 And one of the
reasons that this is no longer true is that administrative law has progressed, surely and rapidly, from the foundations laid by White and his
associates, to the present commanding position it occupies.
The executive ordinances and bureau decisions which supplement the
statutory authority upon which a commission or bureau rests and which
form administrative law must be understood to include the sub-legislation which always accompanies it, and which forms the nucleus around
which the courts and Congress have built the entire system. Succeeding
portions of this chapter will show that White pronounced on this quasilegislation, and drew, in broad outlines, the boundaries of restraint.
Among the types of this sub-legislation as commonly defined are the
following seven:
1. delegation of power to the executive to organize the governmental authorities
2. delegation of power to make rules and regulations affecting legal fights of
government employees
3. delegation of power to make regulations affecting the rights of citizens
4. allowance of discretion to officials to fill in details in the general act
5. delegation of power to find fact or to start an action
6. delegation of power to establish standards, norms, or principles
7. delegation of authority to the executive with power to re-delegate.' 5
The Origin and Development of Administrative Law
The extraordinary rapid growth of administrative law has occurred
during the last fifty years since the establishment of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. This span includes in its earliest and most
formative years the period of Edward Douglas White's service on the
supreme bench. One of its most marked characteristics was the enormous multiplication of governmental officials and'agencies vested with
regulatory functions.' These bodies together with their powers owe
much to White's interpretatidn of the law, made necessary by a congeries
of causes which include:
1. inadequacy of state regulation of child labor, pure food and drugs, lotteries,
bankruptcies, banking and corporation practices
14. Isaacs, Judicial Review of 'Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YAME L. J. 783.
15.
16.

BLAcnLY AND OaT .Ar, ADMnSTRATm' LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATio
Dickinsbn, supra, note 12, at 513.

(1934) 21.
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2. uneven distribution of wealth
.3. technological, commercial, industrial superiority of the national government
over state governments
4. public regulation of private enterprise
7
and at least a dozen more.'
While it is a commonplace that the American 'law is derived chiefly
from the English common law, the complexity of the current American
system was not present in the earlier English legal system, although
many kinds of writs did tend to divide and subdivide life for legal
treatment.1 8 Not in reaction to this early practice, but rather in opposing
the system to which he had been subjected, "the Puritan was averse to
administration, as involving subordination rather than consociation, and
the pioneer, who had little need of it, was by instinct opposed to regulation or supervision as involving needless interference with the freedom
of grown men."' 9 Hence, using the forms', terms, and phraseology of
the common law, the early American settler was tending to build up a
system subtly but unmistakably different from the English in many
respects. These doctrines were embodied in the Constitution and were
interpreted by the courts. "They are what the courts, thinking largely
in terms of the common law, have long declared them to be."20 Since
most of our legal thinking and legal action is controlled by what the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, say, it follows that their doctrines are peculiarly important in the development of administrative law.
One of the doctrines enunciated by the Court, that of sovereignty, is
paramount to an understanding of the law, for it is the concept which
"in the last analysis, gives the federal government such absolute powers
in respect to foreign relations, war, immigration, taxation, and customs.
The principle of jurisprudence that the government cannot be sued without its consent is another expression of the common law conception
of sovereignty.'121 Invested with the attribute of sovereignty, the federal
government has been in a most favorable position for the furtherance of
many legal doctrines, and among these were a number -upon which has
been conferred the name administrative law. Here can be observed the

17.

Blachly, op. cit. supra, note 14, 2-9; Haines, Effects of the Growth of AdminWstra-

tive Law upon Traditional Anglo-American Legal Theories and Practices (1932) 26 Am.
POL. Sci. REv. 875-894.
18. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 6 Am. L. ScHooL REv. 219.
19. Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards (1919) 44 A. B. A. RFP. 450.
20.

BLACmIY AND OArrw, FEDERAL REGULATORY AcTioN AND CONTROL (1940)

21. Id. at 8.

8.
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importance of White's theories of sovereignty and the inherent powers
of the federal government., Had he not been thoroughly impressed before
ho came to the bench, as his Senate speech2 2 indicates that he was, with
the necessity of allowing the national government to exeicise its extensive powers in numerbus and carefully regulated channels, it is doubtful
that the course of administrative law could have been so firmly traced
in the beginning of this century. It must not be supposed, nevertheless,
that this development has taken place outside the realm of the common
law or the Constitution. The course of its history has been devious, but
it has been, on the whole, consistent with the traditional legal and constitutional growth.'
The reception which was given this supposed intruder into the field
of law was by no means a cordial one.2" To the common-law lawyer,
the field of administrative law was a bewildering and irritating region,
wherein his own familiar terminology was tortured and extended into
senses he had never imagined. The resultant recasting of political and
legal theory-always a painful process in the quickly congealed element
of the law-and the tortuous struggles between the branches of the
federal government in their efforts to determine precisely their own
status, have not added to the happiness of the common law practitioner.25
These difficulties were practically non-existent for the civilian lawyer,
and for one who had practiced both kinds of law, it was a matter of comparative simplicity to translate the new legal forms into understandable
terms in either kind of law.
Early Growth of Administrative Law in the United States
The courts had explained, as early as 1825, that Congress did posses's
the right to delegate to others the powers which it might rightfully exercise itself. In the case of Wayman v. Southard,"6 the Court held that
this was proper to Congressional action, but this early dictum had been
forgotten in the acceleration of application of law to the problems arising
after the War between the States. It was an unusual situation that this
acceleration was directed on its precipitate course by a man who at
22. 23 CONG. REC. 6513-6520, 6560-6582 (1892).
23. BLACHLY, FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION (1940) 8.
24. Rosenberry, Administrative Law and the Constitution (1929) 23 Am. PoL. Sci.
REv. 44.
25. Id. at 34; McGuire, supra, note 2, at 43.
26. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Fwnctions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892, 896
citing the case (1825) Wheat. I, 42. It is ordinarily given as 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825).
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least had attempted to prevent the preliminary actions necessary to its
growth.
It is reasonably safe to conclude that the phenomenon accompanying
most of the increase in administrative law was the preoccupation of
government with the control of- economic aspects of private business,
or with the social and economic status of groups within the American
populace. "The administrative tribunal was used as the mechanism to
carry the public will as expressed in the form of legislation to its point
of application to our social and economic scheme."" The kinds of decisions, and the kinds of tribunals, have multiplied as rapidly as the law
has grown, and the Justices who had most influenced the course of
administrative development have been White, Holmes, Taft, and Brandeis.
The latter two inherited a series of precedents established by
White and by his younger-in point of service-colleague, Holmes. From
the most rudimentary kind of administrative activity, decisions have
come to be given in the form and with the force of 'general rules and
regulations, thereby becoming practical components of the working law,
while the pronouncements of so-called quasi-judicial tribunals have come
to be truly judicial by reason of their decisions dealing with questions
of definite rights. 9
Since the time of the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission notable strides have been made in the delimitation of administrative law. As one may cite M'Culloch v. Maryland," the Legal Tender
Cases, 3 ' the Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board 2 in
the field of constitutional law, so one may cite almost any Interstate
Commerce Commission case, or the equally well-known landmarks of
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line,' Londoner v. Denver, 4 and Ohio Valley
Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough35 in the field of administrative
law. The large number of Interstate Commerce Commission cases de27. Stason, Study and Research in Administrative Law (1939) 7 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
684, 685.
28., Aitchison, Justice Holmes and Administrative Law (1933) 1 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
165, 169.
29. BLACHLY, ADmNmXRAIVS LEGISLATION (1934) 1.
30. 4 WEAT. 316 (U. S. 1819).
31. 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1872).
32. 301 U. S. 103 (1937):
33. 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
34. 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
35. 253 U. S. 287 (1919).
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cided by White and the strength which his opinions gave to this body
alone would denote his importance in this field?
In the final analysis, however, it is not the regularly established system
of courts which produces most administrative law, but the administrative
tribunals proper, which are not entirely composed of lawyers, and which
have rules of procedure proper to themselves.3 7 The regularly constituted courts often review the decisions of these bodies, or the actions
of administrative officials, and in some cases they refuse to do so."
Ground for consideration or refusal of consideration is usually based
upon the practice of the tribunal itself.3? "If the statute" is ambiguous,
and extrinsic aids must be employed, the court indicates a preference
for 'the practical and long continued construction' by administrative
officers rather than legislative history and Congressional debates."4
This attitude is largely based upon White's own stand in regard to such
situations, and wherever stare decisis is found in administrative law, it
operates most surely in securing the application of this principle to the
case in hand.
The crossing and re-crossing of the lines which theoretically separate
the branches of government is overwhelmingly manifested in the consideration of administrative law. "It is a commonplace that the exigencies
of effective administration permit little more than lip service to the
classic notion that all government activity should be chopped into blocks
and handed out, like Gaul, to three separate custodians."' Since this
is true, the three departments each exercise some control over administrative law, with the judiciary occupying by far the most extensive
territory, as one might anticipate.
Congress, however, is the branch which must act first, for it not only
determines governmental policies and functions, but it ordinarily establishes the administrative agencies to carry them out. The extent to
which it defines duties of officers or details of governmental organization
varies greatly, although in the case of regulatory agencies such as the
36. E.g., Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U. S. 452 (1910);
Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Chicagg and Alton R.R., 215 U. S. 479 (1910); Baltimore
and Ohio R.R. v. U. S. ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481 (1910).
37. Radin, supra, note 4, 470-476.
38. Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1921) 35 H~Av. L. Rv.
127, 134, 135, citing International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U. S. 303 (1894).
39. BLAcr.ry, FEDERAL REGULATORY Acnior (1940) 193.
40. (1932) 1 GEo. WAsir. L. REv. 112, citing United States v. Shreveport Grain and
Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77 (1932).
41. Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication (1936) 51 PoL. Sci. Q. 383.
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Interstate Commerce Commission it usually lays down the broad terms
of procedure, and it may do so in other cases. The vagueness of these
criteria is generally characteristic of any norms laid down for adminisis exercised through Contrative legal matters. Chief control, naturally,
42
appropriations.
over
power
gressional
Mere mention of Congressional authority to constitute administrative
agencies and tribunals would be misleading if it did not include reference
to one of the most hotly disputed questions in this connection. There
is a principle often quoted by wfters on legal matters to the effect that
delegata potestas non potest delegari. Stated concretely, and in reference
to the instant case, this implies that Congress, which, within its delegated
power, possesses all legislative power, cannot delegate any part of this
authority to a subordinate agency. If it can do so at all, to what extent
and under what conditions may it delegate? That these are not idle
questions is demonstrated by the decision in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corporationv. United States,4" where the decision indicated that a more
stringent regulation of the delegated power would have resulted in a
different outcome.44 This was a vital question in the early years of
administrative law's growth, and it was one with which White's unique
background found him peculiarly fitted to deal. Administrative courts,
with their droit administratif, were a permanent feature of the civil
law system which had given him his first practical experience, and the
state and municipal governments of Louisiana offered additional opportunities for observation of administrative tribunals.
In the nationpl government the executive exercises strong and extensive control over many administrative agencies, since most of them function under the authority of an executive department. Increasingly, the
authority of the executive over many of these agencies is circumscribed
by the terms of the legislatiye enactments which constitute them, and
such stringent provisions have recently been upheld by the courts,' as
in the case of Rathbun v. United Statds."6 Nevertheless, since the growth
42. BrAcr.L',
43.
44.

FEDERAL REGULATORY

AcTo

(1940) 107.

295.U. S. 495 (1935).
Much earlier Mr. Justice J. R. Lamar had observed, in the case of United States

v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 517 (1911): "It must be admitted that it is difficult to define
the line which separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative authority to
make regulations." He continued, at 521, "But the authority to make administrative rules
is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative
to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense."
45. BLACErLy, FEDERAL REGULATORY Acr oN (1940) 107.
46.

295 U. S. 602 (1935).
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of administrative law began, the power of the executive over it has
grown increasingly, but largely for extraneous reasons. The forum of
last resort is still the court, and not the legislator or the executive. Relying upon the Constitution, Congressional statutes, and previous pronouncements of the courts, the present courts have maintained a most
effective check upon administrative tribunals, with the result that they
have firmly established control over the administration, holding it within
its field of competence and within the bounds of law, over conduct, by
preventing, abuse of power, and over individuals, by guaranteeing their
7
4

rights .

As a consequence of the vigilance of the courts over administrative
practice individual rights, whether positive, negative, or procedural, are
sought to be safeguarded.4" All the ordinary methods of procedure may
be resorted to; or only some of them, or perhaps none. The courts must
consider not only what were the jurisdictional attributes of the tribunal
being considered, the powers granted to it by the statute of its creation,
the inter-relationships of state government and the tribunal, and the type
of work performed, but they must also notice what power they may
exercise themselves in case of appeal. In addition to these issues, there
are more abstruse questions: whether the case involves law, fact, or
mixed law and fact, discretion or procedure, what was the form of the
original administrative action, and what were the nature and form of
the original proceeding.49 Even stated so baldly, this is a rather formidable list of requirements for a reviewing court. The difficulties become
more and more imposing and disquieting when it is realized that each
kind of administrative agency operates under its own peculiar kind of
procedure, and, in almost every case, with its own distinctive rules of
evidence. Hence, the %complexities of administrative law, staggering
enough even before they come into conjunction with the legislative and
executive branches, become almost overwhelming when the judiciary
enters the picture.
This is the picture of administrative law as it has developed within
the framework of the American legal system. While it is evident that
it did not confront White with all the complexity that it has since assumed, it is nevertheless certain that all the problems which administrative' law presents today existed in embryo at the time that White first
delivered a'decision in a case involving administrative law. There is,
47. BLACHLY, FEDERAL REGULATORY ACTION (1940) 108-110.
48. Id. at 110-111.
49. Id. at 113.
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furthermore, no doubt that many cases classified in other fields of the
law-taxation, immigration, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, government of territories, to mention a few types-really relied
most heavily upon the determination of some administrative principle
for their solution. Reference to such cases must necessarily be made
in connection with those types to be considered in later chapters of this
study. Where the cases were concerned primarily with administrative
law, however, and where White's opinions were determinative of that
-law, or indicative of the course which it was to follow, they will be
discussed as administrative law cases, properly denominated. At least
fifty of the nine hundred odd cases with which White was coicerned
form landmarks in this field of the law, and many others shed important
light on it even when they are bounded by some other department of
the law.
Chief Justice White and Administrative Law
There is a parallel between the position of John Marshall in the case
of Marbury v. Madison 0 and in White's treatment of a number of questions in administrative law. Superficially considered, each Jusice was
presented with an opportunity to enlarge greatly the power of the judiciary; in each case, by rejecting the apparent advantage, both Marshall
and White added to the prestige of the Court by defining more firmly
its limitations and prerogatives. Perhaps nowhere is this better illustrated, in the latter Justice's career, than in his opinion in the leading
case of Ocednic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stramahan.1 Discussing the
validity of a Congressional statute empoweing an administrative officer,
here a customs official, to impose penalties, he refuted the contention
that imposition and enforcement of penalties is primarily a judicial
function. Such a contention, he averred, "magnifies the judicial to the
' and is theredetriment of all other departments of the Government," 52
fore contrary to, and outside of, the common constitutional practice of
the courts. The effect of the pronouncement was to allow administrative
action of this kind to be applied in appropriate instances, and to draw a
sharply defined line of cleavage between administrative practice and
judicial action.
In general, White's attitude in his dissenting opinion in Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
50. 1 Cranch. 137 (U. S. 1803).
51. 214 U. S. 320, 338 (1909).
52. Ibid.
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Co.' is a fair indication of the method which he followed in deciding
all questions of law, but particularly those of administration. Where a
case fell under some broad principle of interpretation, he was content
to follow the accepted construction, or to express his disbelief in the
principle; when, on the other hand, a case was distinguished by particular features which withdrew it from any inclusive principle, he was
equally content to leave the determination of original questions to a
tribunal of a specialized nature, or to express his dissent from his colleague's failure to follow this course, in the minimum amount of space. 4
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was second only to the Interstate Commerce Act with its perfecting amendments in bringing noteworthy litigation before the courts, although the latter act was far more responsible
for the early direction followed by administrative law. Because of the
nature of the Sherman Act, and the prominence of the parties involved
in the suits arising under it, great publicity was given the decisions
rendered therein, and voluminous has been the literature since published
upon the subject. Mr. Justice Holmes, nevertheless, remarked that great
cases make bad law,55 precisely because of the undue amount of attention excited by their entirely accidental qualities. For this reason, probably, White's opinions under the Sherman Act, while provocative of
attention, did not contribute as solidly to the development of administrative law as did those he gave in cases heard under the Interstate
Commerce Act. In his first expression of opinion under the Sherman
Act, he defined what was later to arouse so much opposition, the rule
of reason.
This definition was formulated in a dissent in United States v. TransMissouri Freight Association in 1897. Mr. Justice Peckham, for the
majority, had already distinguished reasonable from unreasonable restraints of trade, and White simply argued along the same path to a quite
different conclusion. Not in an attempt to play upon w6rds, as he was
charged with doing in a later case, but in an effort to point out the inevitable consequences of the opinion reached by the majority, he protested their failure to exercise the rule of reason in determining what
constituted reasonable restraints of trade. The later Clayton Act and
the cases which arose thereunder, as well as those which continued to
53., 218 U. S. 88, 112 (1910).
54. Ibid.
55. See Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 400 (1904). (dissenting opinion).
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appear until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, furnished corroboration for his assertion that "the construction which reads the rule
of reason out of the statute embraces within its inhibition every contract or combination by which workingmen seek to peaceably better
their condition."" 6
His lengthy examination of the case continued with a pertinent query
as to the utility of the establishment by Congress of a Commission
charged with the duty of determining rates which the Court had seemingly declared non-determinable.17 From this he proceeded to a conclusion that the Interstate Commerce Commission had demonstrated
by its own actions its belief in the practicality of reasonable restraints
of trade, since, some of its rulings had already taken the position that
they were to be encouraged."8
Fourteen years later the same arguments were adduced, this time' for
the majority, in Startdard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States."
This litigation found White the Chief Justice, which partially explains
the widespread publicity of his decision. He examined minutely the
charter of the Stand.rd Oil Corhpany, pointed out that it was a combination in restraint of trade, and thence proceeded to dissolve it on
the ground that the restraint as exercised was unreasonable. Seven of
his brethren shared his opinion, but Harlan dissented violently therefrom, although he, too, maindtained the illegality of the corporation. 0
61
Harlan's last paragraph epitomized the censure bestowed upon White.
He was charged with having performed a purely political act, one which
was "legislation pure and simple."62 There was no doubt of the weight
166 U. S. 290, 356 (1897).
57. Id. at 372.
58. Id. at 374.
59. 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
60. 2 PRiNGLE, Lma AND Tnns o WniuAms HowARD TArT (1939) 664.
61. "I dissent from that part of the judgment of this court which directs the modification of the decree of the Circuit Court, as well as from those parts of the opinion
which, in effect, assert authorit4, in this court to insert words in the Anti-Trust Act which
Congress did not put there, and by which, being inserted, Congress is made to declare, as
part of the public policy of the country, what it has not chosen to declare." 221 U. S. 1,
106 (1911). Comparison of this remark with White's opinion in the Employers' Liability
Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908) is interesting; there White announced: ".. . the argument
is this, that.. . the words 'any employe' as found in the statute should be held to mean
any employe when such emliloye is engaged only in interstate commerce. But this would
require us to write into the statute words of limitation and restriction not found in it."
Id. at 500.
62. 2 GREsmiir, Lirn OF WA=R QUncTON GREsnAu (1919) 655; see also p. 811.
56.
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and moment of the decision, although it was declared to have been
couched in a "singularly cumbersome and obscure English style. '
There were divergent results from this one decision, much after the
manner which White himself had predicted would follow, the Trat Missouri decision. In some quarters action was taken in the form of
letters; in others, articles, brochures, or books were written in attempts
to clarify the issue, or more practically, to persuade the country of the
truth or falsity of one side of the controversy. 4 The furore eventually
died away, but the Sherman Act, despite its having been sustained by
the decision, was discovered to be a poorly written statute, particularly,
as White had earlier pointed out, in respect to labor unions. White's
reasoning was lauded by President Taft at a later date, and the con63. FLYNN, GOD'S GOLD (1932) 444.
64. President Taft, for instance, in THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT
we find that the state of the common law when Congress passed
(1914) 20, wrote: "...
the anti-trust statute was that contracts in restraint of trade, in so far as they restrained
a party to the contract, were void, unless they were reasonable in the sense that they
were merely ancillary to a main contract which was lawful in its purpose, and were reasonably adapted and limited to that purpose, and that all contracts or combinations in which
the contradicting parties agreed to combine to restrain the trade of a third party or affect
it injuriously were void at common law, and there were no reasonable contracts or combinations in restraint of trade of that kind. . . . Our anti-trust statute, however, now
makes such restraints, which were thus only void and unenforceable at common law positively and affirmatively illegal, actionable, and indictable." Albert H. Walker, author of a
book on the Sherman Act, wrote "Unreasonable" as Applied to Trusts, 11 MoODY'S MAGAZINE (1911) 395. He later reprinted it as a monograph: The "Unreasonable" Obiter Dicta
of Chief Justice White in the Standard Oil Case (n.p., n.p.) (1911). Former President
Roosevelt received two letters from C. G. Washburne, and replied, in reference to an
enclosure from Senator Francis E. Warren, "I shall read that letter with the utmost
interest. As you know, I believe that the attempt to suppress corporations is all nonsense,
and that we must put forth an effort to regulate them in wise fashion. . . ." This letter
was written on October 6, 1911: October 24 found him writing to Washburne: "I agree
with your letter excepting that instead of repealing the Sherman Act it comes to me that
such an act as I desire, and one substantially what you wish, could be so drawn as to
supercede sic the Sherman Act, wherever the latter was in conflict with it." These letters
form part of the Roosevelt collection in the Library of Congress.
In this connection it is noteworthy that a list of prosecutions under the Sherman
Act was compiled by the Department of Justice at Taft's request. Extending, in all probability, to November 1911, of his administration, it shows:
Under Harrison - 4 bills in equity, 3 indictments
Under Cleveland - 4 bills in equity, 2 indictments, 2 informations for contempt
Under McKinley - 3 bills in equity
Under Roosevelt - 18 bills in equity, 25 indictments, 1 forfeiture proceeding
- 14 bills in equity, 27 indictments
Under Taft
Taft Papers, case 14, series 2
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troversy was characterized as the unfortunate outcome of verbal
differences. 5
Police Power
Notwithstanding the wide public interest in this case, it failed to
indicate the scope of White's interest in problems of administration.
The division of authority inherent in the dual nature of American
government was the cause of a long series of his decisions in administrative law. They define the limits beyond which neither the state nor
the national governments may go in exercising power granted them by
Congress or secured to them by the Constitution. It is a commonplace
of American governmental theory that an extensive twilight zone exists
between the two clearly defined spheres of national and state jurisdiction.
Within this zone fall a number of the powers generally designated as
the police powers of government. Their description and classification
often become the subject of opinions in administrative law, partially
because such powers are frequently redelegated, and partially because
they occasionally conflict with an already existing administrative tribunal.
The earliest case of this type in which White was concerned was that
of Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 0 wherein he wrote the dissenting opinion
in the 5-4 decision. The situation involved an Ohio statute, the Nichols
law, which had created a state board of assessment to determine the
valuation of state-owned property of telegraph and telephone companies. Since these companies were in interstate commerce, the findings
of the board inevitably conflicted with the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. While the majority of the Court joined Chief
Justice Fuller in upholding the Nichols law, Field, Harlan, and Brown
concurred in White's assertion that no state, by means of a board or by
any other means, had a right to tax property with a situs in another
state, or to use such property as a basis for taxing other property within
the state. 7 Reflecting his well-crystallized views on the spheres of action
occupied by the respective jurisdictions is his definition of the taxing
power:
"It is elementary that the taxing power of one government cannot be lawfully
exerted over property not within its jurisdiction or territory, and within the
territory and jurisdiction of another. The attempted exercise of such power
would be a clear usurpation of authority, and involve a denial of the most
65. N. Y. Times, June 7, 1914, #6, p. 8, col. 1.
66. 165 U. S. 194 (1897).
67. Cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925)
277 U. S. 218 (1928).

and Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox,
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obvious conceptions of government. This rule, common to all jurisdictions,
is peculiarly applicable to the several states of the Union, as they are by the
Constitution confined within the orbit of their lawful authority, which they
cannot transcend without destroying the legitimate powers of each other, and,
therefore, without violating the Constitution of the United States.""
His dissenting opinion was repeated in the following case, that of
American Express Co. v. Indiana," in which a similar set of circumstances produced a similar result.
The next example of supervision of state police power, the case of
Rhodes v. Iowa,7° evoked from White little more than the declaration
that moving packages from a platform to a warehouse did not constitute removing them from interstate commerce. Simply stated thus, it is
difficult to see the reason for the dissent of Gray, Harlan, and Brown,
but their assertion that the decision acts as a curtailment of the police
power of the state reveals that the Interstate Commerce Commission's
authority has been sustained, an important consideration in view of the
later Wilson, Webb-Kenyon, and Ashurst-Sumners Acts.
Not the shipment of freight alone, but also the carrying of passengers
was the theme of an Ohio statute which brought the Lake Shore and
Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Ohio suit before the Court. 71 White
dissented from Peckham's opinion here, upholding, as it did, a law which
required all companies operating three or more trains a day to stop at
every town of three thousand or more. Employing more prominently
than usual his customary sorites,7" White held that the statute operated
in a discriminatory fashion, both as to railway companies, and as to
communities served. As he pointed out, the figures chosen were entirely
arbitrary ones, but the majority could not be persuaded to accede to
this view.
The next case involving police power also found White arrayed with
the opposition, although he was content to agree with Peckham's dissent
from Brewer's opinion in the suit, one by Lindsay and Phelps Co. v.
Mulen.73 The state statute here protested was one empowering an inspecting official to impose a lien upon lumber which had come under
his supervision. Brewer, for the majority, upheld the grant on the theory
68.
69.
70.
71
72.
"73.

165 U. S. 194, 230 (1897).
165 U. S. 255, 256 (1897).
170 U. S. 412 (1898).
173 U. S. 285 (1899).
Id. at 336.
176 U. S. 126 (1900).
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that it afforded a legitimate channel for the exercise of the state's police
power, but Harlan and Brown joined Peckham and White in a dissent
based upon a belief that the state's action constituted a coercion sufficiently serious to impose a burden upon interstate commerce.74
These cases in which White dissented show clearly his belief in the
possibility of distinguishing the national from the state government as
to police power, and they indicate at the same time his insistence on the
superior power of the national government. This attitude is what has
impelled some writers to speak of his dual federalism, and his nationalism, but it is also an indication of the consistency with which he followed out the ideas presented in his earlier political career. Although a
philosophy of states' rights had never existed for him, his expressions
became increasingly nationalistic, and his explorations of administrative
problems became of ever greater importance.
Yet his tendency to assert the nationalist position was not so strong
as to cause forgetfulness of the realm of state authority. In Andrews v.
Andrews7 5 for example, he repeated the consistent decision of the Court
that a state may not be prevented from exercising its "inherent authority
to preserve the public morals" by the application of the contract clause
of the Constitution.7 6 Brewer, Shiras, and Peckham dissented from the
opinion in which White explained the connection of the police power
with the authority of the state over marriage and divorce.
Again, in his dissent in the case of Northern Securities Co. v. United
States,77 White adopted the same mode of reasoning. One of the contentions of the majority had been that the concentration of stock of
foreign corporations within the confines of the home state of the corporation constituted a direct burden upon interstate commerce. To this
assertion, White posed the question:
"Can it in reason be ,maintained that to prescribe rules governing the ownership of stock within a State in a corporation created by it is within the
rules for the regulation of intercourse between citizens of
power to prescribe
78
different States?"
And he answered his own query some pages later by declaring:
"True, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce are subject to the power
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 154.
188 U. S. 14 (1903).
Id. at 34.
193 U. S. 197 (1904).
Id. at 369.
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to regulate commerce, and therefore such instrumentalities when employed in
interstate commerce may be regulated by Congress as to their use in such
commerce. But this is entirely distinct from the power to regulate the acquisition and ownership of such instrumentalities, and the many forms of contracts from which such ownership may arise. . . . This difference was pointed
out in the 6ases which have been referred to [in the arguments], and the
distinction between the two has been from the beginning the dividing line, demarking the power of the .national government on the one hand and of the
States on the other."79
The conclusion unavoidably following from the action upheld by Harlan
and four of his associates was, in White's view, that "the sum of property to be acquired by individuals or by corporations, the contracts
which they make, would be within the regulating power of Congress."8 0
To the extent that White's dissent here expresses the belief that Congress
may not locally regulate business or production, the decisions in United
States v. Butler"1 and Mullord v. Smith82 offer interesting confirmation
that such is now the attitude of the Court.
State authority was defined by White as the object which Congress
had endeavored to strengthen in the passage of the Wilson Act, a statute
which had been enacted in an effort to delimit and describe the power
of the Interstate Commerce Commission over shipments of liquors moving into areas which had prohibited their sale or use. The problem of
the precise effect of the statute was decided by White in Pabst Brewing
m
Co. v. Crenshaw,'
wherein he declared that Congress had legitimately
exercised its power over interstate commerce to confer upon the states
the authority to deal with alcoholic beverages as though they were a part
of domestic commerce.8 4
Yet authority conferred upon the state either by the Constitution or
by Congress was not sufficient, in White's opinion, to allow the state to
act in an arbitrary or capricious fashion toward foreign corporations located within her jurisdiction. Writing an opinion concurring with that
of Harlan in Western Union v. Kansas, 5 he maintained:
"It is to be observed that the view taken by me does not deprive the State
of power to exert Its authority over the corporation and its property in the
79.

Id. at 393.

80. Id. at 397.
81. 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
82. 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
83. 198 U. S. 17 (1905).
84. Id. at 27.
85. 216 U. S. 1 (1910).
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amplest way subject to constitutional limitations. It simply prevents the State
from driving out the corporation which is in the State by imposing upon it
arbitrary and unconstitutional conditions, when upon no possible theory could
the right to exact them exist, except upon the assumption that the corporation
is not in the State, and that the illegal exactions are the price of the privilege
of allowing it to come in."86
As Holmes remarked on another occasion, he often looked to the consequences of his decisions, as he did here in denying the validity of the
tax. Similarly, he concurred with McKenna's dissent in Caminetti v.
United States,8 7 since he shared his colleague's view that greater evils
would arise from the Mann Act than those which it was intended to
prevent.
8s
Cases customarily joined with this are United States v. Doremus,
and Webb v. United States, 9 in each of which White also dissented.
They arose under the Harrison Narcotic Act, which was upheld by Day
and four other Justices, but which White attacked on the ground that
Congress had exercised authority not delegated but retained by the state
within its police power. These dissents are not of as great significance,
however, as the preceding ones in this category of cases arising under
interpretations of administrative law.
Delegation of Power by Congress
Of far greater significance is the series of decisions which White wrote,
or from which he dissented, under the generic heading of delegation of
legislative power. These were interpenetrated with subtle distinctions
concerning delegation and sub-delegation of authority originally granted
by the Constitution to Congress, or by state constitutions to their own
legislatures. The extent and nature of the original grant had to be examined, of necessity, before the ability to make new delegations could be
affirmed. Earliest of such decisions written by White was that in United
States v. Santa F6, ° which involved the construction of an old Spanish
statute allegedly, granting four leagues of territory to every town in* the
Spanish New World containing thirty inhabitants. Displaying great
familiarity with both Spanish language and law, White examined at
length the allegations of the city as to its right to the area claimed. More
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 51.
242 U. S.
249 U. S.
249 U. S.
165 U. S.

470, 502 (1917).
86 (1919).
96 (1919).
675 (1897).
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important for the development of administrative law, however, was his
examination of the delegation of the Congressional authority to survey
land and to confer the right to hear controversies arising from the surveys upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office and his subordinates throughout the country. Such a delegation, he declared, must
be strictly defined and limited. The jurisdiction of administrative tribunals created by Congress must be marked out in definitive terms, and
cases which are brought before such bodies must be similarly clarified,
so that it may be seen that they fall within the competence of the act.9f
So clearly and firmly was the principle stated that its applicability in
later situations has become axiomatic, and it is a settled rule of construction that the courts examine the statute and the action of the
administrative courts in each case arising before them, to determine the
exactness with which the constituent act has been followed.92
White dissented from Peckham's opinion in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty 3 without explaining his reason for so doing.
In a substantially similar case, Public Clearing House v. Coyne,94 he
concurred in Brown's opinion, but again without giving a reason. He
concurred in Brown's opinion in Benson v. Henkel,9 5 a 5-4 decision in
which Day, Peckham, and McKenna comprised the remainder of the
majority. This was a case involving the alleged bribery of a Land Office
official in California, in which Day's most revealing statement in the
realm of administrative law was that an "order or removal involves
judicial rather than mere ministerial action, and must be issued by the
Judge of the District when the case made warrants it,"96 thereby asserting the jurisdiction of the customary procedure of court practice over
precedent administrative action.
It was nearly three years after this decision before White again ex-pressed himself in this division of the law, and the cases were the
highly interesting Employers' Liability Cases.T Attacking the statute
91. Id. at 714.
92. -Cf. Blachly, op. cit. s pra, note 20, passim.
93. 187 U. S. 94 (1902). The school had been charged with using the mails to defraud,
and the postmaster had refused to deliver mail addressed to the school or its officers. Mr.
Justice Peckham held that questions of fact within an administrative department are for
the department to' decide, but this does not prevent the courts from redressing grievances,
since otherwise administrative action would be uncontrolled.

94. 194 U. S. 497 (1904).
95. 198 U. S. 1 (1905).
96. Id. at 16.
97. 207 U. S. 463 (1908).
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which had sought to impose upon employers the responsibility for injuries to employees engaged in interstate commerce occupations, whether
such injuries were or were not due to their own carelessness or negligence, and which thereby destroyed the old fellow-servant rule, White
denied its legality on every head. His final argument furnishes an excellent illustration of the method he pursued in arrivirig at a decision:
"It remains only to consider the contention ...that the act is constitutional
although it embraces subjects not within the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, because one who engages in interstate commerce thereby submits
all his business concerns to the regulating power of Congress. To state the
proposition is to refute it. It assumes that because one engages in Interstate
commerce he thereby endows Congress with power not delegated to it by the
Constitution, in other words, with the right to legislate concerning matters of
purely state concern. It rests upon the conception that the Constitution destroyed that freedom of commerce which it was its purpose to preserve, since
it treats the right to engage in interstate commerce as a privilege which cannot
be availed of except upon such conditions as Congress may prescribe, even
although the conditions would be otherwise beyond the power of Congress.
It is apparent that if the contention were well founded it would extend the
power of Congress to every conceivable subject, however inherently local,
would obliterate all the limitations of power imposed by the Constitution, aLnd
would destroy the authority of the states as to all conceivable matters which
from the beginning have been, and must continue to be, under their control so
long as the Constitution endures."98
The preceding quotation contains within it several features characteristic of White. He often used the expression "even although," an awkward substitute for the much more comimon, and perfectly correct, "even
though." Another favorite locution was the statement of a proposition
in 'such form as would enable him to declare it self-refuted, as in the
first sentence above. 'Finally, and more substantively, the quoted paragraph contains another statement of th6 inherent powers of Congress
and of the states, a doctrine which was implicit in all White's decisions.
Much administrative practice had settled into position by the time
White wrote his definitive opinion in the aforementioned case, Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranalzan." The litigation involved the, authority of Congress to provide for inspection arid collection of money penalties by executive officers, and while White upheld the navigation company's contention that the penalties had been unfairly imposed, he sus98. Id. at 602.
99. 214 U. S. 320 (1909).
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tained Congressional authority to provide for their imposition. It was
established judicial construction, he declared, to concede the legality
of such action by Congress, and to allow executive officers to impose
and enforce penalties "without the necessity of invoking the judicial
power,'0
The reasoning by which White arrived at this conclusion was not involved, but came directly from a consideration of the treatment by the
courts of parallel authority of Congress. Viewing one such treatment,
White asserted:
"the plenary power of Congress as to the admission of aliens leaves no room
for doubt as to Its authority to impose the penalty, and its complete administrative control over the granting or refusal of a clearance also leaves no doubt
of the right to endow administrative officers with discretion to refuse to permeans of enforcing
form the administrative act of granting a clearance as a 101
the penalty which there was lawful authority to impose."
By alluding to the Court's failure to consider the question which would
arise if an executive officer were to exercise authority proper to the
judiciary, he further delineated the status of administrative law at the
time in which he spoke." 2 Since this question did not arise in the instant
case, it was not, according to settled judicial practice, further noticed;
indeed, the attention given to the possibility in this one remark is a
departure from custom.
The FederalIncome Tax Act
One of the leading cases in administrative law, Brushaber v. Union
Pacific,'0 was the next, chronologically, in this series decided by White.
It came before the Court under the Federal Income Tax Act of 1913,
on the charge that the administrative provisions of the Act were unconstitutional. Discussion of income taxation was always one of White's
chief interests, judging from his earliest dissents and opinions, and his
remarks in this case as to the conflict between the taxing power and the
due process clause are enlightening from this viewpoint, as well as for
the insight they give into his constitutional interpretations of each clause.
The due process clause, he explained, "is not a limitation upon the
taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 101.
Ibid.
240 U. S. 1 (1916).
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words, . . . the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring,
upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away on
° The Act in
the other by the limitations of the due process clause."104
question was upheld chiefly on this basis, and it was only in the last
paragraph that he referred to the administrative question which had
originally brought the case before him. Again resorting to one of his
favorite devices, he-contended that merely to state the objection that
the Secretary of the Treasury had been wrongfully empowered to enforce the aft was simultaneously to refute it. The apparently cavalier
dismissal of the case is explained by his reference to preceding decisions
which this one was at once the summation and the
of the Court, °5 of
106
decision
definitive
The same Income Tax Act was involved in suits decided less than a
month later, those of Dodge v. Osbor, 0° and Dodge v. Brady.' s Declaring at the outset that it had been long settled that suits may not be
brought to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes on the basis of
unconstitutionality, he dismissed both cases despite their argument that
the appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was wanting in due
process. 1 9 In both of these cases, and in the one considered immediately
above, White's words give little indication of the power he conceded
to Congress. This power allowed administrative questions, which were,
as noticed early in this chapter, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial or
both, to be decided by officers occupying positions created by Congress
and exercising authority which belonged, in its essence, to that body.
In the opinion of White, such exercise of authority was quite natural,
and scarcely to be questioned, but the mere fact that it Was so often
made the subject of lawsuits shows how ill-defined and badly-understood
an authority it had been.
There is a logical sequence of thought between these cases and the
next case, which arose under the Naturalization Act of .1906. Decided
on November 13, 1916, Cross v. United States" ° gave White occasion
to declare that fees charged by clerks for drafting declarations of intention to become citizens must be determined on the basis of the specific
104.
105.
(1904),
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 24.
Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S. 649 (1894); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470
and Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
240 U. S. 1, 24 (1916).
240 U. S. 118 (1916).
240 U. S. 122 (1916).
Id. at 118, 121, 122.
242 U. S. 4 (1916).
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statutes involved, and not according to some other law. Here again the
significance of the case is not indicated by the words of the decision,
for it imports that administrative actions must be defined and described
by single statutes, a practice which has resulted in the enormous multiplicity of administrative statutes, and which has impelled some writers
to favor codification of administrative law. The decision reflects, too,
White's wariness of allowing a too-comprehensive statute to include specific cases, and is thus indicative of another characteristic of the law
which was so recently exemplified in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.'
When he came to consider the' case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Maryland Railway Co.," 2 White saw no difficulty in upholding the assailed Webb-Kenyon Act, an ingenious extension of the Wilson Act which
he had earlier sustained. Reviewing at length the decisions of the Court
under the interstate commerce clause, he redefined the positions of the
state and national governments, contending that there is no essential
difference between subjects regulable by states in the absence of congressional action, and those free of state regulation under the same condition. Such accidental considerations, he stated, were not the criteria
by which Congressional legislation and delegation of authority were to
be considered, but rather "the right to regulate and its scope and the
mode of exertion must depend upon the power possessed by Congress
over the subject regulated."" 3 It followed that, granting that Congress
had the authority to make laws over the subjects to be regulated, its
authority to control them by means of delegated officers was likewise
secure.
Following this identical line of reasoning was his opinion in Wilson
v. New," 4 the first case arising under the Adamson Law of 1916. Whether this opinion was "unquestionably... the most important opinion that
he wrote in his judicial career,""' must remain a matter of conjecture,
but it served to re-emphasize those principles upon which he had been
insisting for two decades, and it involved, to some extent, a redress of
those grievances which he had foreseen would result from the Sherman
Act.
More concisely stated than the same principle had been in the Clark
case is his assertion that: "It is equally certain that where a particular
111.

298 U. S. 238 (1936).

112.

242 U. S. 311 (1917).

113.

Id. at 331.

114. 243 U. S. 332 (1917).
115. Spring, Two Chief Justices (1921) 64 RxviEw or Ramrws (A.mmcAsm)

169.
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subject is within such authority [of Congress to regulate commerce] the
extent of regulation depends on the nature and character of the subject
and what is appropriate to its regulation."'' 0 Examining the background
and history of the railway emergency which' brought about the passage
of the Act questioned, he could see' no reason for concluding therefrom
that the statute was unconstitutional. On this contention he remarked
in words echoed twenty years later by his onetime colleague and second
successor, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 7 that "although an emergency may not call into
life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may
afford
s
a reason for the exertion of aliving power already enjoyed.""
The living power, in his view, was the control of Congress over interstate commerce, and therefore over its instrumentalities, even when they
were persons, and insofar as public rights were concerned. It is this
supervision of public rights, placing the statute partially within the
national police power, which serves to explain the importance of the
case in administrative law. The fact that the law required specific
administration and came within the purview of the Interstate Commerce
Commission was no less important, for this circumstance allowed administrative law to be applied more widely to real perpons, and f6rced
administrative tribunals to inaugurate changed procedure to meet the
new situation.
Even though the position of persons was so sweepingly affected by
White's decision in the Wilson case, a similar case failed to elicit from
him anything but a dissent unaccompanied by comment. This was in
Bunting v. Oregon,"9 where even McKenna's challenging statement that
"the constitutional validity of legislation cannot be determined by the
degree of exactness of its provisions or remedies,"'"2 did not sufficiently
arouse White to cause him to write an answering statement. It was
two years later before he wrote an opinion dealing with this aspect of
administr.tive law, in United States v. Ferger.'a The statute attacked
was one enacted in 1916, making it a contradiction to the interstate
commerce clause to forge, utter, or publish bills of lading. Returning
to the argument adduced in Wilson v. New, White contended that the
116.
117.

243 U. S. 332, 346 (1917).
290 U. S. 398 (1934).,

118.

243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917).

119.

243 U. S. 426 (1917).

120.

Id.

121.

250 U. S. 199 (1919).
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ability of Congress to legislate under the commerce clause resulted from
the effect of subjects considered in relation to commerce. The presence
of fraudulent bills of lading would have a sufficiently damaging effect,
he felt, to make it quite feasible for Congress to legislate upon the
matter.
Accordingly, the breach, or alleged breach, of the statute
would come within the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and also within that of the Secretary of the Treasury, thus allowing the possibility of administrative action from either group of officers,
and accomplishing a delegation of Congressional authority over currency
as well as over commerce.
The last cases arising under this aspect of administrative law were the
National ProhibitionCases.'2 The opinion was written by McReynolds,
but White contributed concurring remarks. It had been charged that
the concurrent grant of power to the state and national governments to
enforce the Volstead Act was unconstitutional. White remarked, in this
connection, that such a grant could not be construed to mean that Congress had no power to "create by definition and sanction, an enforceable
amendment."'1 24 Allyifng himself with the majority, he sustained the
administrative measures adopted by Congress to support the Eighteenth
Amendment, and thereby also gave an impetus to the tremendous growth
of administrative law which occurred during the next two decades.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
It will have been observed, throughout the foregoing discussion, that
while the decisions given concerned Congressional delegation of power
to designated agencies, in many instances such delegation was specifically
or by implication made to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Since
the largest number of cases arose under the interstate commerce clause,
or under statutes implementing this clause, the situation was natural
and inevitable. The powers, rights, and duties of the Commission, however, were also the subject of legal action, and it is this type of case
which forms the last large group considered as administrative law.
These cases defined the position of the Commission, and furnished criteria for its own action, as well as for that of other tribunals.
The first such case to be decided by White was East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission.2 The
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 203.
253 U. S. 350 (1920).
Id. at 392.

125.

181 U. S. 1 (1901).
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Commission had issued a cease and desist order to the company, commanding it to refrain from discriminating among cities in Tennessee by
varying its rates on a long-haul, short-haul basis. White disposed of
the matter of rate discrimination in short order, by declaring that the
Commission's "elaborate findings of fact" had been made after hearings,
and that since these had not been questioned in the lower courts they
were not now subject to review. 2 This simple statement was often
repeated in subsequent cases of this type, and its effect was to guarantee
as binding upon the courts the Commission's findings of fact. The
breadth of scope thereby given to that body was tremendous, and the
precedent stated by White secured to it power which might otherwise
have been much lessened.
Notwithstanding this. affirmative grant, White's next statement in
the case was to have an opposing effect. The Commission had, in its
findings, ruled that dissimilarity of conduct in carriers because of conditions or circumstances outside their control could not be taken into
account by them without the Commission's consent. In effect, declared
White, this amounted to saying "that the dissimilarity of circumstances
and conditions became a factor only in consequence of an act of grace
or a discretion flowing from or exercised by the commission."'2 7 He
continued:
"But it has been settled by this court that competition which is controlling
on traffic and rates produces in and of itself the dissimilarity of circumstance
and condition described in the statute, and that where this condition exists a
carrier has a right of his own motion to take it into -view in fixing rates to
the competitive points."'' 2
The plenary power of the Commission over determinations of circumstances and condition was thus denied, and the effect of the denial following so closely upon the admission of the power to find facts concerning rates was sharply to delineate the authority which could be exercised
by the Commission. This result was further elaborated by the action
of White in continuing to discuss the Commission's procedure in ordering
the railway to cease charging more for a short than for a long haul. A
desist order of this kind, he ruled, would be insufficient by reason of
its vagueness, for allowing the carrier to charge another rate at his own
election would not prevent his charging another unreasonable rate.-2
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 11.

128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 23.
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Yet the Commission's action was not left condemned or censured in
the slightest degree by White's words, for he concluded his opinion with
a further clarification of the relationship between the courts and the
Commission. It was the duty of the latter, according to White's estimate
of the Interstate Commerce Act, to furnish aid to the reviewing courts
by determining in the first instance those original causes and questions
of fact proper to the cases appearing before it. The courts were "entitled,
before approaching the facts, to the aid which must necessarily be afforded by the previous enlightened judgment of the commission upon such
subjects." 3 Hence it can be seen that in this one case White had performed three services in regard to the power of the Commission: he
had declared its findings of fact binding upon the courts; he had warned
the Commission that its orders must be of a specific nature, and incidentally he had informed Congress that its grants of power must be more
detailed; he had affirmed the dependence of the courts upon the preliminary activity of the Commission, and had thereby taken an important step in establishing a reciprocal relationship between the courts and
the Commission. The functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission
were thereafter more clearly recognized and accepted, both internally as
to the Commission, and externally as to entities outside it, although it
is doubtful whether there was an immediate recognition that White had
ruled affirmatively upon the legislative as well as the judicial power of
the Commission.
On the same day that this decision was given, a similar one was handed
down in the somewhat similar case of Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Clyde Steamship Co.,... and for the same reasons. The next year,
however, saw a more rigid ruling in the matter of ascertainment of facts.
The case at bar, in one of White's often-used expressions, was Interstate
Commerce
Commission v. Chicago, Burlington, andt Quincy Railroad
3 2
Co.

Facts found by the Commission here were not of a sufficiently

substantial character to sustain the type of order which had been issued,
and White could conclude only that it was not incumbent upon the courts
to undertake an independent investigation of the facts in order to substantiate the order. 3 The conclusions from this statement are obvious;
they have regulated the relation of the courts and the Commission ever
since, for while findings of fact are not questioned nor re-investigated
130. Id. at 27.
131. 181 U. S. 29 (1901).
132. 186 U. S. 320 (1902).
133. Id. at 341.
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by reviewing courts, the appropriateness of the Commission's decisions
thereon have always been ruled as within judicial review.
When there has been no finding-or no substantial finding-of fact as
to alleged dissimilarity of circumstanes and conditions, White ruled, in
the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v..Louisville and Nashville
Railroad,3 4 the order of the Commission muste likewise be rejected.
Elucidating the Interstate Commerce Act, he pointed out that its fourth
section referred to "an actual dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions, not a conjectural one,"' 185 and since in the instant case the Commission's order had been issued in view of a dissimilarity which it only
suspected would inhere in the future, the Court was constrained to
overrule it.
3 6
It difThe next case in point of time was Buttfield v. Stranahan.
fered from most cases in that it involved a determination of the question
of allowing a general administrative rule to apply in similar cases, instead
of making specific rules, at an. administrative official's discretion, in
pdrticular cases.' 37 After a preliminary discussion of the power of Congress over commerce, White asserted that "a statute which restrains the
introduction of particular goods into the United States from considerations of public policy does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution."' 3 It was but a step from this assertion, in view of previous decisions under the Interstate Commerce Act and other acts, to the
conclusion that sinqe Congress was unable to act in individual cases
it might legitimately allow executive officials to bring about the result
intended in the statute. "To deny the power of Congress to delegate
such a duty would, in effect," he insisted, "amount but to declaring that
the plenary power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could
not be efficaciously exerted." He also said that "the statute was the
fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of the
Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy
declared in the statute.' 39
The far-reaching decision here announced was strengthened and confirmed by the decision of the next two cases on its authority. 40 From
134. 190 U. S. 273 (1903).
135. Id. at 283.
136. 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
137. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation (1920)
138. 192 U. S. 470, 493 (1904).
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139. Id. at 496.
140. Buttfield v. Bidwell, 192 U. S. 498 (1904); Buttfield v. U. S., 192 U. S. 499 (1904).
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these cases involving situations other than those of common carriers,
White returned to the adjudication of the more frequent type of litigation in New Hdven Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission.'4 '
It was the contention of the company that its position was unlike that
of other railroads, since it acted as a dealer in commodities as well as
common carrier. Admitting the existence of these facts, White nevertheless maintained that the conclusion drawn therefrom was untenable;
the power of the Commission over every common carrier was not to be
denied.' 4 2 He referred also to rulings in two similar cases 43 of an antecedent period and remarked:
"... without reviewing the rulings made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in those cases and adhered to by that body during the many years
which have followed those decisions, we concede that the interpretation given
by the Commission in those cases to the act to regulate commerce is now
binding, and as restricted to the precise conditions which were passed on in
the cases referred to, must be applied to all strictly identical cases in the
future, at least until Congress has legislated on the subject. We make this concession, because we think we are constrained to do so, in consequence of the
familiar rule that a construction made by the body charged with the enforcement of a statute, which construction has long obtained in practical execution
...must be treated as read into the statute."' 44
The familiar rule here noted was the one he had himself formulated in
the East Virgin '4 5 case, that is, that the Commission's findings of fact
which had not been questioned in the lower courts would be accepted by
the Supreme Court without investigation.
Familiar though this rule had grown to be, it was not until the leading
case of Texas and Pacific Railway v. A bilene Cotton Oil Co.'46 that the
exact relationship between rulings made by the courts and those made
by the Commission was defined. The binding force of the Commission's
ruling was again asserted, but in stronger terms, for if, 'as White
contended,
"without previous action by the Commission, power might be exerted by courts
141. 200 U. S. 361 (1906,).
142. Id. at 399.
143. Haddock v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 4 I. C. C. 296 (1890),
& Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 4 I. C. C. 535 (1891).

and Coxe Bros.

144. 200 U. S. 361, 401 (1906).

145.

East Tenn., Virginia and Georgia: Ry. Co, v. Interstate Commerce Commission,

181 U. S. 1 (1901).
146. 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
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and juries generally to determine the reasonableness of an established rate,
it would follow that unless all courts reached an identical conclusion a uniform
standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as the standard would
fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclusions reached as to
reasonableness by the various courts called upon to consider the subject
as an original question. Indeed the recognition of such a right is wholly 1in47
consistent with the administrative power conferred upon the Commission ....
He had devoted three pages to an exhaustive discussion of the duties
of the Commission,' 48 and by finally securing to it this exclusive power
to declare, establish, and maintain rates he had denied to the courts any
original jurisdiction over such matters. 49 It is this feature of the
decision which has caused it to be recognized as precedent-forming;
this subordinate administrative body had now been declared, in an unbroken series of decisions by White, to be outside the ordinary course
of law both as to executive and judicial functions, as well as to those
legislative acts which had been originally assigned to it. Yet this declaration did not result in a usurpation of power by the Commission, nor
in a cessation of litigation under the terms of the Interstate Commerce
Act, as it would seem must have happened had undue advantage been
taken of the situation.
The next three cases to come before the Court and to be decided by
White were those of which the Secretary to 'the Commission had written
to President Taft, assuring him that the decisions strengthened the
power of the Commission so materially. They were Interstate Commerce
Commission v. 'Illinois Central Railroad,15° Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago and Alton Railroad,"5' and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Uited States ex rel. PitcairnCoal Co 52 In what was one of his
clearest decisions, White examined the steps which he felt the Court
was required to take in determining whether an order of the Commission
should be suspended or set aside, and then explained them, remarking,
"Beyond controversy, in determining whether an order of the commission shall
be suspended or set aside, we must consider, a, all relevant questions of constitutional power, or right; b, all pertinent questions as to whether the administrative order is within the scope of the delegated authority under which it
147. Id. at 440.
148. Id. at 436.
149. Id. at 442.
150. 215 U. S. 452 (1910).
151. 215 U. S. 479 (1910).
152. 215 U. S. 481 (1910).
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purports to have been made; and, c, a proposition which we state independently, although in its essence it may be contained In the previous one, viz.,
whether, even although the order be in form within the delegated power, nevertheless it must be treated as not embraced therein, because the exertion of
authority which is questioned has been manifested in such an unreasonable
manner as to cause it, in truth, to be within the elementary rule that the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the
power. . . . Plain as it is that the powers just stated are of the essence of
judicial authority, and which, therefore, may not be curtailed, and whose discharge may not be by us in a proper case avoided, it is equally plain that such
perennial powers lend no support whatever to the proposition that we may,
under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our conception as
to whether the administrative power has been wisely exercised."'153
This clear distinction of judicial from administrative authority was
supplemented by his remark in the last-named of the trio of cases, in
which he rejected the assertion that the grievances in controvdrsy were
outside the administrative competence of the -Commission. Such a contention, according to his decision, would be more worthy of notice if
it had first been brought before the Commission so that that body might
have had an "opportunity to exert its administrative functions."' 54 From
this censure of the litigants, he proceeded to explain in greater detail
than that given in the first case decided that day the reason for assuring
to the Commission its competence as a rate-making body. Positing two
cases involving rates, one fixed by a judicial court and one determined by
the Commission, he queried pertinently, "Which would prevail?" The
answers possible under any circumstance were then given:
"If both, then discrimation and preference would result from the very prevalence of the two methods of procedure. If on the contrary, the commission
was bound to follow the previous action of the courts, then it is apparent that
its power to perform its administrative functions would be curtailed, if not
destroyed. On the other hand, if the action of the comnission was to prevail,
then the function exercised by the court would not have been judicial in character, since its final conclusion would be susceptible of being set aside by the
action of a mere administrative body." 55
It is evident from this last remark that White could not be charged
with abdicating any essential judicial authority in favor of an adminis153.
154.

215 U. S. 452, 470 (1910).
215 U. S. 481, 493 (1910).
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trative body. The next decision he wrote, in Southern Pacific Co. V.
Interstate Commission, 6 offered an illustration of his attitude on this
point, for he here declared that the Commission had not the authority
to revise rates merely to bring about a conjectural equality of treatment
among shippers.:' 7 So to act would have been an assumption of judicial
competence and discretion which had never been granted to the
Cormission.
On the other hand, such an assumption of authority by a common
carrier was even less excusable, according to his view of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad3'8
This case contested, in White's words, "the right of a carrier to make
the ownership of goods the criterion by which his charge for carriage
is to be measured."' 59 He had no hesitancy in rejecting the existence
of such a: right, and in reaffirming the cardinal principle that the Commission's declaration that such a practice would be discrimination embodied "a conclusion of fact beyond our competency to reexamine."'160
It should not be concluded, from the fact that these cases had all
dealt with the Interstate Commerce Commission that a similar principle
would not govern state commissions of like description. White demonstrated this very clearly in Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. La. R.R. Commission,'6 ' by simply restating his principle that the findings of fact
unquestioned
in the lower courts were not reviewable in the Supreme
2
O6

Court.

All of these decisions had been directed to the definition for the courts
or for the Commission of the duties, rights, and restrictions proper to
them under the Interstate Commerce Act and its subsequent perfecting
amendments. In 1920 a departure from this line of decisions was made
in United States ex rel. Kansas City Southern Railway v. InterstateCommerce Commission' 6 3 This suit arose out of an amendment to the original Act which empowered the Commission to investigate and evaluate
property owned by a common carrier. The Commission failed to employ
this power, even at the request of the railway professing the utter impossibility of arriving at an evaluation. White maintained that the Con-'
156.
157.
158,
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

219 U. S. 433 (1911).
Ibid.
220 U. S. 235 (1911).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 255.
232 U. S. 338 (1914).
Id. at 339.
252 U. S. 178 (1920).
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mission had erred in refusing to perform a duty exacted by the statute,
and his ruling was that in refusing to exercise the authority granted to
it the Commission was actually assuming authority it did not possess.'
From this deviation from the logical course of the decisions in this
type of case, White returned to the more usual pattern in Quong Ham
Wak v. Industrial Commission,'0 5 in which he extended his rule concerning reviewability by the courts to prohibit reconsideration of a
state statute in terms other than those sanctioned by the state court of
last resort.' 66
The Quong Ham Wak case was the last one in which White was concerned primarily with administrative law and its problems, for within
two months after its decision, illness and death had removed him from
the supreme bench. The cases involving, directly and indirectly, administrative law had been so crystallized along the pattern conceived by
White that they have continued to rule subsequent decisions of the
Court. Particularly may this be said of the last subdivision of cases, in
which White's chief concern was the determination of the position of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by the influence of the precedents created therein, on all succeeding commissions of a similar
character.
It will be noticed that White gave every one of the opinions in this
classification, whereas in the others he was sometimes content to be
represented by a dissenting or concurring opinion or mere record. While
all these cases except two involve the Interstate Commerce Commission
itself, the principles which they contain are sufficiently inclusive to be
applicable to all other types of commissions, and since the Interstate
Commerce Commission was so much a pioneer in the field of administration, it is fitting that the judicial principles enunciated by White in
its behalf should also have been precedent-creating.
White's contribution to the other types of administration, noted in this
chapter before consideration of his contribution to the growth and
position of the Commission, need not be minimized by the pre-eminent
position he took in the latter instance. Difficult as it may be to evaluate
E jurist on the basis of written opinions only, it would seem inipossible
to avoid the conclusion that in these opinions White demonstrated his
juridical ability, and formulated principles which succeeding jurists have
jeen content to follow or to amplify.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 187.
255 U. S. 445 (1921).
Id. at 448.
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Appendix
Significant changes in the course of development of American administrative law, phenomenal growth and multiplication of agencies, continuous-and occasionally acrimonious-discussion of the role of this field
of law, and a tremendous outpouring of literature on the subject have
characterized the legal history of America for the past five years. In
some cases, perhaps, administrative law has developed as might have
been expected; in other cases, some writers contend, it has proceeded in
an utterly unpredictable and sometimes incomprehensible fashion. What
are the highlights of this growth, as they appear to those most closely
associated with the law?
In an effort to discover the answer to this question, the most recent
legal literature on the subject was examined. Administrative law, it is
a truism to say, is not a static but a dynamic factor in the field of
American law today. The foregoing pages show a fairly representative
portion of the material which has appeared on this subject to the time
that the manuscript was placed in the hands of the printers. Since that
time eighteen months have elapsed, and it seemed desirable to explore
the more recent literature on administrative law, with the intention of
noting the amount and scope of such writings and of determining whether any noticeably new trends in the consideration of the subject could
be discerned.
During the past four years there have been published more than five
hundred articles on administrative law. They include every type of
discussion, from discursive historical treatments of the subject, through
highly specialized and technical writings, to symposia which vary greatly
in value and content, but which all have a common aim-to explore the,
subject from as many angles as possible.
"That American administrative law is in a ferment of thought must be sensed
by all. There have been many informal gatherings and formal conferences and
institutes called to explore the subject. The law review literature, including
symposia, is growing apace. Case books are beginning to multiply. Individual
scholars are conducting special researches. . . All the diagnostic activity men-

tioned above means a conscious effort to examine administrative law as a field
and to locate the heart of the problem of reconciling 'administrative justice'
with the spirit of the 'rule of law'. 10 7
Obviously, it would be impossible to read and digest the valuable information in all these articles; many of them, moreover, had no applica167.

Hart, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (1941) 29 GEO. L. J. 545.
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bility to a discussion of administrative law as it affects the American
people as a whole, since the writers of these articles were occupied with
some purely local, or technically involved, special problem. From the
articles remaining after this* elimination, about one-tenth of the total
number were examined. One other consideration was here operative: if
a writer had already been cited in the discussion of White's influence
on this field of law, his later writings were consulted for evidences of
changed or strengthened opinion. This was true particularly of Blachly
and Oatman, Dickinson, and Hart.
Two tendencies appear almost immediately. One is an exemplification of what a British authority on the subject has well noted as the
possibility of predicting
"a man's opinion of the so-called encroachment of the executive upon the
legislative and judicial powers from a knowledge of his social philosophy.. In
both countries [England and America] much opposition to departmental activities springs from a fundamental disagreement with the legislative policy
which the department hs to enforce. In both countries a loser may well wish
to multiply the opportunities of judicial review or of appeal from administrative tribunals, and in this desire he may rely on forensic acquiescence. The
academies are divided; if some schools seem to encourage expansion, others
are loyal to the constitutional principle of separated powers and to the common-law faith in an orthodox judicature..."I'll"
Possibly this was true in the earlier writings on the subject, but there
seems very little doubt that Sir Cecil's contention is, in the main, true,
and that mich of the discussion of administrative law has sprung from
a preoccupation with settled convictions concerning the nature of
government.
The other tendency is apparently a healthier and more promising one
for the future of administrative law. This attitude regards the field in
question as containing, or as being a "mass of problems to be solved
rather than as something to be resented or ignored."' 6 9 When practitioners and writers began to adopt this attitude it was evident that the
amount of uncertainty and confusion in the field had yet to be fully
realized. 7 9 Out of this attitude, however, have come three encouraging
approaches to the problem(
The first of these is the disbassionate consideration, based upon extensive and intensive researches, of the present condition of administra168.
169.
170.

Carr, Administrative Adjudication in America (1942) 58 L. Q. REV. 487.
Isenbergh, Developments in Administrative Law 1930-1940 (1940) 27 VA. L. REv. 29.
Id. at 30.
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tive law. Studies such as those of Blachly and Oatman show that it is
possible to clarify many broblems by comparing the techniques and procdures of numbers of administrative agencies.r 1 By distinguishing
types of procedures, these investigators make it possible for other groups
to suggest a constructive reform in administrative law.Y2 They offer
an enviable pattern for similar investigations.
As a direct result of this type of investigation, the second approach,
that of specific recommendations for reform, appears. Not only do pri7
but official agencies of difvate investigators suggest these reforms,"'
fering character-e.g., the American Bar Association, the -AttorneyGeneral's Committee on Administrative Procedure, and the Moreland
Commissioner of the State of New York-make concrete, practical, and
specific suggestions as to reform and simplification of administrative
law.' 4 Though it is true that these agencies have been very sharply
criticized, their reports have at least the merit of foundation on research,
and of recommendation of specific action. Whether or not they are
adopted, they have certainly rendered invaluable service already. Stemming from such reports is probably the most concrete suggestion that
has been made-the establishment of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure.
The finil approach is that adopted first by the Attorney General's
Committee, and now being adopted gradually by other groups. It is
simply that of realizing that one of the biggest handicaps under which
administrative law labors is that of mystifying obscurity in the minds
of the citizens. The Acheson committee particularly noted this characteristic of administrative law,, and regarded it as regrettable. If there
were no other outcome of all the researches and reports than an interest
and activity in clarifying the operation of administrative law, it is hardly
too much to say that none of the efforts of those concerned have been lost.
171.

Blachly and Oatman, A New Approach to the Reform of the Regulatory Procedure

(1944) 32 GEo. L.

J. 327.

172. Id. at 370; Norwood, Administrative Evidence in Practice (1941) '10 GEo. WASH.
L. Rav. 17.
173. Blachly, supra note 171, at 374; Norwood, supra note 172, at 16.
174. Carr, supra note 168, at 490; Blachly, supra note 171, at 325.
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